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 ZIGZAGS ON RIGHTS OF 
ACCUSED: BRITTLE 
MAJORITIES 
MANIPULATE WEASEL 
WORDS OF DIALOGUE, 
DEFERENCE, AND 
CHARTER VALUES 
Don Stuart* 
I. OVERVIEW 
Four of the most significant Charter1 decisions from the Supreme Court 
respecting criminal justice over the past year were Golden (December 6, 2001: 
constitutional standards for strip searches), Shearing (July 6, 2002: defence 
right to cross-examine on a diary), Hall (October 10, 2002: denying bail to 
maintain public confidence constitutional) and Sauvé (October 31, 2002: 
federal prisoners’ right to vote not to be restricted). 
In each of these decisions the Supreme Court was deeply divided. This paper 
examines and then comments on the sharp divides in each case. It is also 
suggested that some of the reasoning places too much reliance on “weasel 
words” such as “dialogue,” “deference,” and “Charter values.” This stance may 
well be provocative as the Concise Oxford Dictionary2 defines a “weasel word” 
as a “word that is intentionally ambiguous or misleading”! Shearing raises 
wider issues of how to balance competing rights; here the Charter rights of the 
accused to a fair trial with the privacy and equality rights of complainants in 
sexual assault cases. It will be suggested that the majority of the Court has 
importantly recalibrated its approach. Finally this paper concludes with some 
general observations about voting patterns and inconsistency on the Supreme 
Court and expresses concern that some members of the Supreme Court show 
little interest in the protection of fundamental rights of the accused.  
                                                                                                                                                              
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. 
1
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 9th ed., 1995, at 1587. 
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II. R. V. GOLDEN3 (CHARTER STANDARDS FOR STRIP SEARCHES) 
A detailed understanding of the sordid facts are key to an understanding of 
the ultimate 5-4 divide in the Supreme Court in this case. 
In an effort to detect illegal drug activity in an area where trafficking was 
known to occur, police officers set up an observation post in an unoccupied 
building across from a sandwich shop. Using a telescope, an officer observed 
the accused giving a white substance to persons entering the shop. The officer 
believed that the accused was trafficking cocaine given the place and manner of 
the transactions. He instructed four “takedown” officers to make arrests. The 
accused and two others were arrested. During the arrests, the police found what 
they believed to be crack cocaine under the table where one of the suspects was 
arrested. The accused was observed to be crushing what appeared to be crack 
cocaine between his fingers. 
Following the arrests, a police officer conducted a “pat-down” search of the 
accused. He did not find any weapons or narcotics. The officer then decided to 
conduct a visual inspection of the accused’s underwear and buttocks on the 
landing at the top of the stairwell leading to basement public washrooms. The 
officer undid the accused’s pants and pulled them back along with his long 
underwear. The officer saw a clear plastic wrap protruding from between the 
accused’s buttocks, as well as a white substance within the wrap. The officer 
testified that when he tried to retrieve the plastic wrap, the accused “hip-
checked” and scratched him so that he nearly fell down the stairs. The officer 
then pushed the accused into the stairwell, face-first.  
The accused was then escorted to a seating booth at the back of the shop. Pa-
trons were asked to leave, but the other two accused, five officers, and a shop 
employee remained inside. The officers forced the accused to bend over a table. 
His pants were lowered to his knees and his underwear were pulled down. The 
officers tried to seize the package from his buttocks, but were unsuccessful as 
the accused continued to clench his muscles very tightly. Following these at-
tempts, the accused accidentally defecated. The package did not dislodge. An 
officer then retrieved a pair of rubber dishwashing gloves used to clean the 
washrooms and toilets, and again tried to remove the package. The accused was 
facedown on the floor, with another officer holding down his feet. The officers 
told him to relax. Once he did the officers were able to remove a package 
which was found to contain 10.1 grams of crack cocaine with a street value of 
between $500 and $2000. The accused was placed under arrest for possession 
of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking and for police assault. He was taken 
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(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Zigzags on Rights of Accused 269 
 
 
to a police station, located about a two-minute drive away. There he was strip-
searched again, fingerprinted, and detained pending a bail hearing. 
Defence arguments that the strip searches on the steps and in the restaurant 
violated section 8 were rejected by the trial judge and summarily by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in a brief endorsement judgment. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, granted leave to appeal. A 5-4 majority of the Court then found that sec-
tion 8 had been violated.  
1. Majority (per Iacobucci and Arbour, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ. concur-
ring)4 
The majority considered it to be unquestionable that strip searches represent 
a significant invasion of privacy and are often a humiliating, degrading, and 
traumatic experience for individuals subject to them. The Court declared a 
number of new minimum standards for strip searches conducted incident to 
lawful arrest: 
 
• Searches cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy;  
• Searches cannot be carried out abusively or for the purpose of humiliat-
ing or punishing the arrestee; 
• The police must have reasonable and probable grounds to justify a strip 
search; 
• Searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner; 
• Searches should be conducted at the police station except where there is 
a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for weapons or objects 
that could be used to threaten the safety of the accused, the arresting of-
ficers, or other individuals.  
 
The majority nevertheless suggested5 that legislative intervention could be an 
important addition to the guidance the Court was setting out. Clear legislative 
prescription as to when and how strip searches should be conducted would be 
of assistance to the police and to the courts. 
While in this case the arrest was lawful on reasonable and probable grounds 
and the strip searches were related to the purpose of the arrest, the majority held 
that the Crown had failed to prove that the strip searches on the steps and in the 
restaurant had been necessary and urgent. The strip search in the restaurant was 
also held to have been carried out in an unreasonable manner. The following 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
 Id., at paras. 23-120. 
5
 Id., at para. 103. 
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questions,6 which drew upon the common law principles as well as the statutory 
requirements set out in English legislation, would provide a framework for the 
police in deciding how best to conduct a strip search incident to arrest in com-
pliance with the Charter: 
 
1.  Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not, why 
not? 
2. Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that ensures the health 
and safety of all involved? 
3. Will the strip search be authorized by a police officer acting in a super-
visory capacity? 
4. Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip 
search are of the same gender as the individual being searched? 
5. Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no more 
than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances? 
6. What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search? 
7. Will the strip search be carried out in a private area such that no one 
other than the individuals engaged in the search can observe the search? 
8. Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a way 
that ensures that the person is not completely undressed at any one 
time? 
9. Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee’s 
genital and anal areas without any physical contact? 
10. If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence in 
a body cavity (not including the mouth), will the detainee be given the 
option of removing the object himself or of having the object removed 
by a trained medical professional? 
11. Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the manner in which 
the strip search was conducted? 
 
According to the majority in Golden the accused was not given the opportu-
nity in the restaurant to remove his own clothing, the strip search was con-
ducted without notice to, or authorization from, a senior officer, and the search 
was carried out in a manner that may have jeopardized the accused’s health and 
safety. Where the circumstances of a search require the seizure of material 
located in or near a body cavity, the individual being searched should either be 
given the opportunity to remove the material himself or herself, or the advice 
and assistance of a trained medical professional should be sought to ensure that 
the material could be safely removed. There was no requirement that the ac-
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cused cooperate in an exercise that constituted a violation of his or her Charter 
rights. In this case, the accused’s refusal to relinquish the evidence did not 
justify or mitigate the fact that he was strip-searched in a public place, and in a 
manner that showed considerable disregard for his dignity and his physical 
integrity, in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or exigent circum-
stances. 
Since the accused had already served his 14-month sentence in full, and be-
cause the courts below did not engage in a subsection 24(2) analysis, the major-
ity declared7 that it was neither necessary nor useful to determine whether the 
evidence deriving from the illegal strip search should have been excluded at 
trial. An acquittal was the proper result. 
2. Dissent (per Bastarache J., McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier J. concurring8 and 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., in a short concurring opinion)9 
Justice Bastarache expressed profound disagreement with these new stan-
dards. In his view, the majority was wrong to require police to prove that they 
had reasonable and probable grounds to justify a strip search. The existing 
common law rule requiring that police demonstrate an objectively valid reason 
for the arrest rather than for the search is consistent with section 8 of the Char-
ter provided that the strip search was for a valid objective and is not conducted 
in an abusive fashion. According to Bastarache J., the discovery of evidence 
should not be postponed to a time when the search can take place at a police 
station. The fear that evidence may be destroyed or lost before arriving at the 
police station was genuine. Police officers are not always close to a station; 
they operate in remote areas and are often alone. In the view of the minority the 
proposed rule that all strip searches proceed at a police station absent exigent 
circumstances should be left to Parliament. Furthermore, by stating that exigent 
circumstances will exist only where there is a demonstrated necessity and 
urgency to search for weapons or objects that could be used to threaten safety, 
the majority had abolished the right to search for evidence upon arrest. In doing 
so, they had drawn an unprecedented and unworkable distinction between the 
objective of discovering and preserving evidence and the objective of searching 
for weapons or other objects that could threaten safety.  
According to Bastarache J. the majority was “excessive to adopt foreign leg-
islation” (referring to the majority’s reliance on English statute law).10 Dis-
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 Id., at paras. 118-19. 
8
 Id., at paras. 1-21. 
9
 Id., at para. 22. 
10
 Id., at para. 8. 
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agreement was also expressed with the majority’s views of the need for au-
thorization by a senior officer, and emphasis on the unilateral decision of offi-
cers, the danger to health and safety, and the failure of the police to give the 
accused the opportunity to remove his own clothing. 
The dissenters did, however, find a section 8 violation in the strip search at 
the restaurant but went on to hold that the evidence should not have been ex-
cluded under subsection 24(2).  
3. Comment11 
(a) Standards or Deference? 
There is certainly room for debate on whether the majority went too far in 
setting out Charter standards for strip searches. Some of the Court’s pro-
nouncements such as the need for authorization by a superior officer, may be 
impractical in remote areas, as Bastarache J. suggests. However Bastarache J. 
shows little respect for the Court’s role as “guardian of the Constitution”12 in 
suggesting that standards for strip searches be left to Parliament. This position 
takes deference to a new level that does little to validate entrenched Charter 
rights. Strip searches are highly intrusive and had become very much part of the 
landscape of the Canadian criminal justice system. Parliament had chosen not 
to intervene despite recommendation from the Law Reform Commission as 
early as 1985.13 This is typical of the ever-increasing law-and-order slant of 
politicians of all stripes who see the promise of few votes from being soft on 
crime and amending the law to favour the accused. It was high time for the 
Supreme Court to assert section 8 standards. Justice Bastarache also suggests 
that it was inappropriate for the majority to rely on standards laid out in legisla-
tion from the United Kingdom. It is not clear why it was improper for the ma-
jority to have developed its standards by looking to the law of other 
jurisdictions — regardless of whether this law was found in court decisions or 
in legislation. 
                                                                                                                                                              
11
 See further Eric V. Gottardi, “The Golden Rules: Raising the Bar Regarding Strip 
Searches Incident to Arrest” (2002), 47 C.R. (5th) 48. 
12
 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigations & Research, Com-
bines Investigation Branch) v. Southam) (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 97, at 110-11 (S.C.C.). 
13
  Report no. 25, Obtaining Forensic Evidence (1985). 
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(b) No Remedy of Exclusion of Evidence 
Golden is disappointing on the issue of remedy. The majority ducked the is-
sue of whether the Charter breaches should lead to the exclusion of evidence; 
the Court was content to regard the issue as moot. Even though the minority 
found that the strip search in the restaurant breached section 8, Bastarache J. 
spoke against exclusion. He reasoned14 that the evidence was not conscripted 
and otherwise discoverable. The search was quite intrusive but the actions of 
the accused led to a diminished expectation of privacy. Exclusion would have a 
more serious impact on the repute of the administration of justice than admis-
sion. Drug trafficking is recognized as a serious crime.  
I have argued elsewhere in an article entitled “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two 
Equals Zero”15 that the trend of inclusion by the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeal in non-conscripted cases, and drug cases in particular, will sterilize 
section 8 protection against unreasonable search or seizure. A recent electronic 
survey of post-Stillman16 subsection 24(2) cases at all levels of court has, how-
ever, found that the level of exclusion of non-conscripted evidence has risen to 
50 per cent, even in drug cases. The message now is “Eight Plus Twenty-Four 
Two Equals Zero-Point Five!17 One hopes that this is an area in which the 
Supreme Court will follow the experience of trial judges who are finding it 
necessary to give section 8 teeth by excluding non-conscripted evidence where 
the violation is seen as serious.18 Many commentators and judges see the Su-
preme Court’s Stillman approach of virtually automatic exclusion of con-
scripted evidence as bad policy and inimical to the discretion set out in 
subsection 24(2).19 It is widely anticipated that the present differently composed 
Supreme Court is poised to return the subsection 24(2) jurisprudence to a dis-
cretionary exercise. Hopefully the focus will be on seriousness of the violation 
rather than seriousness of the offence. Unless there is a real risk that evidence 
may be excluded when obtained in violation of the Charter, Charter standards 
for law enforcement will have little effect or meaning. Too much reliance on 
                                                                                                                                                              
14
 Golden, supra, note 3, at paras. 17-20. 
15
 (1998), 13 C.R. (5th) 50. 
16
 R. v. Stillman (1997), 5 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
17
 Nathan J.S. Gorham, “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point Five” (2003), 6 
C.R. (6th) 257. 
18
 The decision in R. v. Law (2002), 48 C.R. (5th) 199 (S.C.C.) was a step in that direction. 
See now the blockbuster unanimous ruling in R. v. Buhay (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) to 
exclude non-conscripted evidence of marijuana. 
19
 See Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (3d. ed., 2001), at 516-20 for fur-
ther discussion and analysis of views of critics such as Ron Delisle and David Paciocco.  
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the factor of seriousness of the offence will also leave the irony that the Charter 
will have effect only in less important cases.20  
III. R. V. SHEARING21 (RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ON 
COMPLAINANT’S DIARY) 
The accused was charged with 20 counts of sexual offences alleged to have 
occurred between 1965 and 1989. The accused was the leader of a cult. He 
preached that sexual experience was a way to progress to higher levels of con-
sciousness and that he, as cult leader, could be instrumental in enabling young 
girls to reach these higher levels. Two of the complainants were sisters who 
lived in a group home. One, KWG, kept a daily diary for eight months in 1970. 
The day-to-day entries covered part of the 10-year period when she alleged 
sexual abuse by the accused. When the complainant left the group home her 
mother put some of her belongings in a cardboard box in the storage area 
shared with other residents. About 18 months later, after the accused had been 
indicted, another resident of the house opened the cardboard box, found the 
complainant’s diary, and gave it to the defence. 
At trial, the defence sought to use the diary to contradict the complainant on 
the basis of entries arguably inconsistent with her evidence-in-chief, and to 
show the absence of any entry chronicling physical or sexual abuse. The com-
plainant objected to the defence’s use of the diary, and at the voir dire into its 
admissibility, she asserted a privacy interest. The trial judge permitted the 
accused to use the diary to cross-examine the complainant on entries that the 
defence considered probative but did not permit cross-examination on the issue 
surrounding the absence of any entries recording physical abuse by the com-
plainant’s mother or sexual abuse by the accused. The trial judge refused to 
allow cross-examination of the complainant’s diary regarding the fact there was 
no mention of the alleged abuse. The trial judge applied the O’Connor22 princi-
ples respecting production of therapeutic and other records of complainants. 
Justice Donald for the British Columbia Court of Appeal approved the trial 
judge’s decision and approach with these words: 
                                                                                                                                                              
20
 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has recently abandoned its rule of prima facie exclu-
sion and favoured a discretionary balancing exercise relying in proportionality: R. v. Shaheed, 
[2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 377 (C.A.). In the United Kingdom, however, David Ormerod, “ECHR and the 
Exclusion of Evidence: Trial Remedies for Article 8 Breaches?” (2003) Crim. L. Rev. 67, is a 
strong advocate of prima facie exclusion for breaches of Art. 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights occurring in a criminal investigation. 
21
 (2002), 2 C.R. (6th) 213 (S.C.C.). 
22
 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
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Mills23 has shifted the balance away from the primary emphasis on the rights of the 
accused. The decision requires a reconsideration of the position of the complainant, 
and in particular the equality rights of the complainant, so as to effectively guard 
against procedures which deny complainants equal access to and benefit of the 
law.24 
When the matter reached the Supreme Court the Court divided 7-2 on this 
issue.25 The majority held that the trial judge ought to have allowed the cross-
examination and ordered a new trial on this count for which the accused had 
been convicted. 
1. Majority26 (per Binnie J., McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, 
Arbour and LeBel JJ. concurring) 
According to Binnie J., the view in the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
that the balance had shifted from the rights of accused to the equality rights of 
complainants was wrong “even in terms of production of third party docu-
ments.”27 The trial judge had also wrongly applied the O’Connor approach to 
this context of cross-examination on a diary in the hands of the accused. Coun-
sel for the complainant at trial and Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund 
(LEAF) had argued that the machinery of sections 278.1 to 278.9 can be put 
into reverse; that is, it contemplates taking documents already in the hands of 
the defence and restoring these to the complainant thus requiring the defence to 
make a fresh application for the document just removed from its possession. 
According to Binnie J. this interpretation was unduly contrived and did vio-
lence to the statutory language. O’Connor was held to have no application to 
the issue of the admissibility at trial which was to be determined by principles 
laid down in Seaboyer28 and Osolin.29 A simple “balancing of interests” test as 
needed in O’Connor cannot be equated to “substantially outweighs” as de-
scribed in Seaboyer and Osolin. According to Binnie J., under O’Connor the 
default position is that the third-party information is not produced to the de-
fence. Under Seaboyer and Osolin, the default position is that the defence is 
allowed to proceed with its cross-examination. The issue was seen to be 
whether the potential probative value of a cross-examination on the diary “sub-
                                                                                                                                                              
23
 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
24
 R. v. Shearing (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 233, at para. 93 (B.C.C.A.). 
25
 The Court was unanimous that similar evidence had been properly admitted. 
26
 Shearing, supra, note 21, at paras. 75-151. 
27
 Id., at para. 132. 
28
 R. v. Seaboyer (1991), 7 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.). 
29
 R. v. Osolin (1993), 26 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.); considered in Shearing, supra, note 21, at 
para. 133. 
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stantially outweighed” privacy and fairness considerations with respect to the 
third party and whether cross-examination on the absence of entries related to 
abuse relied on “her ‘rape myths’ or the equivalent.”30  
If the trial judge had properly directed himself on the Osolin test he would 
have reached a different result. The conclusion was reached that, viewed from 
the Osolin perspective, the nature and scope of KWG’s diary did not raise 
privacy or other concerns of such importance as to “substantially outweigh” the 
appellant’s fair trial right to cross-examine on the diary (both the selected en-
tries permitted by the trial judge and the absence of entries) to test the accuracy 
and completeness of KWG’s recollection of events 27 years previously.31 
In the course of his judgment, Binnie J. saw cross-examination on the ab-
sence of reference to abuse as a high-risk tactic for the defence capable of 
generating “some devastating answers, to put it mildly.” However, the accused 
considered pursuit of that point to be crucial to his defence.32 
2. Dissent33 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J., Gonthier J. concurring) 
The majority was wrong in deciding that the defence should have been per-
mitted to question KWG on the absence of reference to abuse in her diary. 
First, the trial judge should have ordered the diary returned to KWG, its rightful 
owner, and then required the accused to seek its production through the appro-
priate statutory channels. Second, even if the accused had acquired the diary 
through the proper channels in the first place, the prejudicial effect of the pro-
posed line of questions on the absence of entries substantially outweighed its 
probative value.  
The test for admissibility of defence evidence was indeed whether the preju-
dicial effect of that evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. In 
weighing prejudicial and probative value, the trial judge had, however, to con-
sider not only the accused’s right to full answer and defence, but also the im-
portance of the complainant’s and other witnesses’ privacy and equality rights. 
In this case, the cross-examination would have introduced such a high potential 
of prejudice that it substantially outweighed the minimal probative value of 
questions concerning the absence of entries in the complainant’s diary. It could 
hardly be doubted, said L’Heureux-Dubé J., that a teenager’s personal diary is 
high on the spectrum of records in which one has a privacy interest.  
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 Shearing, id., at para. 109. 
31
 Id., at para. 150. 
32
 Id., at para. 114. 
33
 Id., at paras. 164-85. 
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Proper consideration of the complainant’s equality rights also required an 
appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the context of sexual violence. Allow-
ing questioning on the absence of the mention of sexual assault in the diary 
would be to endorse the same discriminatory beliefs that underlined the “recent 
complaint” myth. The recent complaint myth suggests that the presence of 
certain emotional reactions and the immediate reporting of the assault, despite 
all of the barriers that might discourage such reports, lend credibility to the 
assault report, whereas the opposite reactions lead to the conclusion that the 
complainant must be fabricating the event.  
The defence was required to demonstrate a valid reason for its proposed line 
of questioning. The majority position was that the absence of any entries relat-
ing to physical or sexual abuse was potentially of probative value, depending 
on the complainant’s responses. Accordingly, the complainant should have 
been called on to give these responses before the jury. This determination 
should take place in a voir dire rather than in front of the jury. 
In the case at bar, the prejudicial effect was very high, while the probative 
value was, at best, minimal. The diary is an intimate record of the complain-
ant’s life during the period of time at issue, and the proposed line of cross-
examination would necessarily open up much of the diary’s contents to scru-
tiny. 
Besides constituting a wide-ranging violation of the complainant’s privacy 
rights, the proposed cross-examination also had potential equality implications, 
as victims would naturally be loath to report sexual assaults if they feared that 
their entire private lives would be intensely scrutinized at trial.  
3. Comment 
(a) Balancing Rights of Accused Against Complainants’ Interests 
The Shearing ruling that cross-examination should have been permitted re-
garding the lack of reference to abuse in the diary of a complainant in a sexual 
assault trial appears to recalibrate the balance between the rights of accused and 
those of complainants in sexual assault cases. The new tilt is in the direction of 
full answer and defence for accused. 
It is important to recall the major rulings in O’Connor34 and Mills.35 In the 
context of access by accused to therapeutic and other records of complainants 
in sexual assault cases, all justices of the Supreme Court in O’Connor recog-
nized that complainants had enforceable privacy rights under sections 7 and 8. 
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 Supra, note 22. 
35
 Supra, note 23. 
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A 5-4 majority did not speak of equality rights under section 15 and therefore 
implicitly rejected them. In Mills the Court unanimously recognized, as did 
Parliament in its new statutory regime to control access to records of complain-
ants, the need to balance against rights of accused the privacy and equality 
rights of complainants.  
The recognition of equality rights in Mills was accomplished by reliance on a 
passing reference to equality rights for complainants in Osolin and without 
reference to the new multiple part section 15 test the Court had recently 
adopted for equality rights in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration).36 The Court in Mills emphasized that there was no hierarchy of 
rights, relying once again on Lamer C.J.’s pronouncement to this effect in 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.37 
(b) Equality Values Rather Than Equality Rights 
In the majority judgment in Shearing there is no mention of the principle that 
there is no hierarchy of rights and the language of privacy and equality rights 
for complainants seems to be deliberately softened to that of “interests”38 and 
“values.”39 
Shearing appears to decide that, where rights of accused and privacy and 
equality concerns clash in the context of a trial, it is the rights of accused that 
must be given priority. In the trial context we appear to be squarely back to the 
controversial balancing of values expressed by the majority in Seaboyer. Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) in that case indicated that although complainants 
had privacy and equality concerns, the line had to be drawn short of the point 
that resulted in an unfair trial and the possible conviction of an innocent person.  
That there is a difference in approach is very clear on a comparison of the 
dissenting opinion of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Shearing. Privacy and equality 
rights of complainants are strongly asserted with a very different result. Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé indeed appears to go as far as resisting any form of cross-
examination on the diary. 
The general approach of the majority in Shearing is to be applauded. In the 
context of a criminal trial that focuses on just punishment of the person charged 
rather than compensation of complainants, it is the rights of accused that must 
be given priority. Inconsistent rights cannot be “balanced.” Like Donald J. of 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, I read Mills to hold very clearly that the 
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rights of the accused had to be weighed equally against the privacy and equality 
rights of complainants. Under that view, the accused in a sexual assault case 
would have diminished rights.40 The majority in Shearing goes out of its way to 
backtrack and reinforce the view that even those charged with the heinous 
offence of sexual assault must have a fair trial. The Court here implicitly aban-
dons the view that there is no hierarchy of rights. Some rights are more impor-
tant than others. That is also the position of the South African Constitutional 
Court in interpreting its Bill of Rights.41  
I have suggested elsewhere42 that it was unprincipled and polemic for the 
Court in Mills to assert equality rights for complainants without addressing the 
Law tests, which require careful analysis of comparator groups and the exis-
tence of discrimination on enumerated or analogous grounds before a section 
15 claim is established. The result was constitutional rights for one type of 
victim with uncertain practical consequences, which could have lead, for ex-
ample, to an argument for a right for complainants to be represented throughout 
a sexual assault trial.  
(c) Myths and Stereotypes 
The Court in Shearing now speaks more softly of the need in sexual assault 
trials to avoid arguments based on myths and innuendo. That attitude is de-
manded by policy concerns for complainants but is of a quite different order to 
an enforceable section 15 right.  
On the issue before the Court there is room to argue that the majority may 
not have sufficiently validated privacy issues in a matter as personal as a diary 
or indeed properly refuted the dissenting opinion that the discriminatory doc-
trine of recent complaint was really behind what the defence was trying to do. 
Perhaps the analogy of the recent complaint myth is strained given that this 
diary had been maintained for eight months. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé is certainly persuasive in suggesting that whether 
the defence counsel could cross-examine on the absence of reference to abuse 
in the diary was properly a matter for the judge not the jury. 
Despite such misgivings, the larger import of Shearing is that a 7-2 majority 
has been bold enough, in the emotive context of sexual assault, to reassert the 
pre-eminence of a right to full answer and defence. 
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IV. R. V. HALL43 (DENYING BAIL TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE) 
The Charter issue in Hall was the constitutionality of the separate ground in 
subsection 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code44 for denying bail that Parliament 
had enacted in 1997. That section authorized detention on:  
any other just cause being shown and, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, where the detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence in 
the administration of justice, having regard to all  the circumstances, including 
the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the gravity of the nature of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the potential for a 
lengthy term of imprisonment. 
This ground had replaced the ground for denial of bail “in the public inter-
est,” which the majority of the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in 
Morales.45 
In Hall the Supreme Court was unanimous in ruling that the opening phrases 
“on any other just cause being shown and, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing” were too general to survive Charter challenge and had to be struck 
down. The division in the Court came with the further 5-4 ruling that the re-
mainder of the provision allowing for detention to “maintain confidence in the 
administration of justice” could survive Charter challenge. 
The context of Hall was a horrifying murder. In 1999, a woman’s body was 
found with 37 slash wounds to her hands, forearms, shoulder, neck and face. It 
appeared her assailant had attempted to decapitate her. The murder received 
much media attention and caused significant public concern and a general fear 
that a killer was at large. Based on compelling physical and other evidence 
linking the accused to the crime, he was charged with first degree murder. He 
applied for bail. 
The bail judge held that pre-trial detention was not necessary “to ensure at-
tendance in court” under subsection 515(10)(a) of the Criminal Code nor for 
the “safety of the public” under subsection 515(10)(b). He held, however, that 
detention was necessary to “maintain confidence in the administration of jus-
tice” under subsection 515(10)(c) in view of the highly charged aftermath of 
the murder, the strong evidence implicating the accused, and the other factors 
referred to in subsection (c). The 5-4 majority upheld this decision. 
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1. Majority46 (per McLachlin C.J., L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Bastarache and 
Binnie JJ. concurring) 
According to the Chief Justice any bail provision that confers open-ended 
judicial discretion to refuse bail is unconstitutional. It was a fundamental prin-
ciple of justice that an individual cannot be detained by virtue of a vague legal 
provision. However, according to the majority, the portion of subsection 
515(10)(c), which permits denial of bail where necessary to maintain confi-
dence in the administration of justice, having regard to four specified factors, 
was neither unduly vague nor overbroad.  
As to vagueness it gave sufficient guidance for legal debate. The ground was 
much narrower and more precise than the old public interest ground that was 
struck down as vague in 1992. It relied on concepts held to be justiciable and 
offered considerable precision.  
As for overbreadth, the means chosen did not go further than necessary to 
achieve Parliament’s purpose of maintaining public confidence in the bail 
system and the justice system as whole, and Parliament had hedged the provi-
sion with important safeguards.  
The Chief Justice saw the provision as representing a separate and distinct 
basis for bail denial not covered by the other two categories of flight risk and 
public safety in subsections (a) and (c). It was neither superfluous nor unjusti-
fied. It served a very real need to permit a bail judge to detain an accused pend-
ing trial for the purpose of maintaining the public’s confidence if the 
circumstances of the case so warranted. Without public confidence, the bail 
system and the justice system generally stood compromised. Denial of bail “to 
maintain confidence in the administration of justice” having regard to the fac-
tors set out in subsections 515(10)(c) complied with Charter section 11(e)’s 
requirement that there be no denial of bail without just cause.  
According to McLachlin C.J., this was an “excellent example”47 of the 
courts’ constitutional dialogue with Parliament. 
2. Dissent48 (per Iacobucci, Major, Arbour and LeBel JJ. concurring)  
For Iacobucci J., liberty is at the heart of a free and democratic society and 
our justice system must minimize unwarranted denials of that liberty. In the 
criminal law context, this freedom is embodied generally in the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty and specifically in the right under sec-
tion 11(e) of the Charter not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. It 
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was impossible to justify the sweeping discretion to abrogate liberty that sub-
section 515(10)(c) affords and it should be struck down in its entirety. 
In Morales49 the Supreme Court held that a restriction on the section 11(e) 
right to bail will be valid if it meets the following two conditions: 
 
(1) bail is denied only in a narrow set of circumstances; and 
(2) the denial of bail is necessary to promote the proper functioning of the 
bail system, and is not undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail 
system.50 
 
Subsection 515(10)(c) did not, in the view of the dissent, meet these consti-
tutional requirements. Fear that a bail judge would be unable to protect the 
public without the subsection 515(10)(c) ground was without reasonable foun-
dation. There was no evidence that the bail system was lacking in any way 
before the introduction of the provision in 1997, five years after the “public 
interest” ground for denying bail had been struck down as unconstitutionally 
vague. The Crown could not even raise a convincing hypothetical scenario that 
would require pre-trial detention for reasons not contemplated by subsection 
515(10)(a) or (b). Whether the phrase “maintain confidence in the administra-
tion of justice” had been given a workable standard by courts and/or Parliament 
in other contexts, in the context of subsection 515(10)(c) it was impermissibly 
vague51 because of the failure to establish a plausible and valid ground for 
denying bail that would serve the proper administration of the bail system and 
that was not already covered under the more specific grounds in subsections 
515(10)(a) and (b). Subsection 515(10)(c) was ripe for misuse and could allow 
irrational public fears to override an accused’s Charter rights. In this case, the 
bail judge erred in considering the subjective fears of the public after determin-
ing that there was no risk of flight nor threat to the public. The reaction of the 
public may assist in determining the threat posed by the accused’s release under 
the public safety ground, but that is not what was decided in this case. 
According to the dissent, subsection 515(10)(c) could not be saved under 
section 1 of the Charter. The Crown did not identify a pressing and substantial 
objective furthered by the provision and the provision, which did not exist in 
comparable legal systems, also failed the proportionality test. 
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According to Iacobucci J., the majority had transformed dialogue with Par-
liament into “abdication.”52 
3. Comment53 
(a) Vagueness and Overbreadth 
The 5-4 majority decided that subsection 515(10(c)) is constitutional to the 
extent that it allows bail to be denied not because the accused is a flight or 
safety risk but to “maintain confidence in the administration of justice.” For 
reasons powerfully expressed by Iacobucci J. in dissent, this is a deeply disap-
pointing ruling. Hall effectively overrules the Morales rulings that detention in 
the public interest is too vague and that section 11(e) requires grounds of deten-
tion to be limited to assessment of flight risk and public safety. The surprise is 
that the majority judgment was written by McLachlin C.J. who had joined the 
majority in Morales and dissented in Pearson54 on the basis that the reverse 
onus for narcotic traffickers was too broad. 
The doctrines of void for vagueness and void for overbreadth, already tooth-
less, have even less vitality after Hall. 
(b) Dialogue with Parliament 
On the issue of the much vaunted need for “dialogue with Parliament,” the 
majority sees its decision as an “excellent example” whereas the minority speak 
of an “abdication” of the role of the Court to guard the rights of accused. For 
the minority, Iacobucci J. speaks powerfully: 
The mere fact that Parliament has responded to a constitutional decision of [the Su-
preme] Court is no reason to defer to that response where it does not demonstrate a 
proper recognition of the constitutional requirements imposed by that decision. 
[The] … role of [the Supreme] Court, and indeed of every court in our country, to 
staunchly uphold constitutional standards is of particular importance when the pub-
lic mood is one which encourages increased punishment of those accused of crimi-
nal acts and where mounting pressure is placed on the liberty interest of these 
individuals. Courts must be bulwarks against the tides of public opinion that 
threaten to invade these cherished values. Although this may well cost courts popu-
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larity in some quarters, that can hardly justify a failure to uphold fundamental free-
doms and liberty.55 
In my books the minority has it exactly right. Hall shows that the dialogue 
metaphor is strained and likely to be used to erode rights of accused.56 How 
could the majority not explore the reality that the government snuck in an 
amendment to restore a wide public interest ground into a massive criminal law 
omnibus bill and that there was no Parliamentary debate on the floor or at the 
committee stage. Some dialogue. 
Rhetoric about “dialogue with Parliament” is a far cry from the clear vision 
of Dickson C.J. in Hunter v. Southam Inc.57 that under the Charter the judiciary 
is the guardians of the constitution for the unremitting protection of individual 
rights and freedoms and that the Charter is to constrain, not authorize, govern-
mental action. 
The “dialogue with Parliament” discourse, with attendant corollaries such as 
a presumption of constitutionality and a posture of respect for Parliament,58 
chooses to de-emphasize the very nature of the entrenchment of a Charter of 
Rights and the existence of section 52 of the Constitution Act that makes the 
Constitution the supreme law of the land. The entrenched compromise was to 
allow for demonstrably justified reasonable limits on Charter rights in section 1 
and an override provision in section 33 that permits legislatures to opt out on a 
five-year renewable basis. Once the highest Court has declared minimum Char-
ter standards, absent a section 33 override, the only dialogue in the courts 
should be whether responsive legislation meets those standards. The devastat-
ing impact of Mills and Hall is that these decisions will continue to encourage 
quick “in your face” legislation whenever a legislature does not like a Charter 
ruling and that legislation is likely to survive any new Charter challenge. Why 
should politicians now bother with thinking about a section 33 override? Given 
the law-and-order mood of the community, and the expediency of politicians 
and now the Court, the likely effect will be far less protection for accused. 
Professor Kent Roach has advanced a similar criticism of Mills: 
The court in Mills gave Parliament much more respect than O’Connor received 
from the elected branch of government…. Faced with a direct repudiation of its ear-
lier decision, the court not only blinked, but looked away.... Respect for the rule of 
                                                                                                                                                              
55
 Hall, supra, note 43, at paras. 127-128. 
56
 See my earlier detailed criticism of Mills: Charter Justice, supra, note 19, at 7-10. It is ex-
traordinary that the Court used the need to dialogue with Parliament language to uphold the consti-
tutionality of legislation that enacted word for word the tests preferred by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in her 
dissenting opinion in O’Connor. 
57
 Supra, note 12. 
58
 Mills, supra, note 23. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Zigzags on Rights of Accused 285 
 
 
law required more. The court should either have admitted that it had been wrong 
and overruled O’Connor or required Parliament to use its s. 33 override…. Stealth 
overrides by Parliament and stealth overruling of controversial decisions by courts 
do little to promote careful deliberation about complex and difficult questions of 
competing rights.59 
(c) Possible Limits on Hall  
As a result of Hall it will be difficult for defence counsel to resist a detention 
order when a justice decides that the offence is serious and that the evidence is 
overwhelming (a determination which is in practice often made without evi-
dence being properly lead or tested). 
Possible limits on the Hall ruling could and should be developed from the 
following considerations: 
 
(1)  McLachlin C.J. remarks that “the circumstances in which recourse to 
this ground for bail denial may not arise frequently.”60 
(2)  McLachlin C.J. accepts that the reasonable person making the assess-
ment of the need to maintain public confidence must be properly in-
formed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter 
values, and the actual circumstances of the case.61 Such a test had previ-
ously been adopted by Justice Baudoin for the Quebec Court of Appeal 
in Lamothe.62 “Charter values” are certainly weasel words here in that 
the majority of the Supreme Court is showing so little respect for its 
previous standards. 
(3)  This was an especially brutal offence with evidence that the community 
was fearful about this particular case.  
(d) Ignoring Context 
A surprising and disappointing feature of the majority judgment in Hall is 
the failure of the majority to consider the issue of context. Often the Supreme 
Court has an expansive view of context and is guided by a variety of secondary 
sources; here the majority puts on blinkers. 
In Golden, for example, the majority of the Court considered it important to 
develop standards for strip searches by taking into account Commission Re-
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ports that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are over-represented in the 
criminal justice system and are therefore likely to be disproportionately arrested 
and subjected to personal searches, including strip searches.63 One of the Re-
ports listed was the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the On-
tario Justice System.64 According to that Report, black persons charged with 
drug trafficking and importing offences are 27 times more likely to be denied 
bail than those who are white. Why wasn’t that worrisome statistic relevant to 
the majority’s consideration of whether a ground for detention, based on the 
justice’s perception of public confidence, is unacceptably broad? The issues 
before the Court went to the core issue of whether our bail system is just. 
V. SAUVÉ65 (PENITENTIARY INMATES’ RIGHT TO VOTE) 
In Sauvé a 5-4 majority upheld a constitutional challenge by penitentiary in-
mates to section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act66 that denied the right to 
vote to “every person who is imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a 
sentence of two years or more.” The appellants challenged the Act on the 
grounds that section 51(e) violated the right to vote guaranteed in section 3 of 
the Charter and violated the equality rights guarantee in section 15 of the Char-
ter. A 5-4 majority upheld the challenge on the first ground.  
1. Majority67 (per McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ. 
concurring)  
According to the Chief Justice, section 3 of the Charter guarantees every Ca-
nadian citizen the right to vote. Section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act 
violates that right and that violation could not be demonstrably justified under 
section 1. Deference to Parliament can be appropriate in cases of competing 
social and political philosophy. Here, the issue was not a question of competing 
social and political philosophies, but a conflict between a guaranteed funda-
mental right and Parliament’s denial of that right. The fact that the legislation 
follows judicial rejection of a previous more comprehensive denial does not 
require the court to defer to Parliament as part of a dialogue: Parliament’s laws 
must conform to the Constitution at every stage. 
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Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized that there must be a constitutionally 
valid reason for infringing a right: a simple majoritarian political preference for 
abolishing a right would not be constitutionally valid. Here, section 51(e) was 
not directed at a specific problem or concern. The asserted objectives were to 
enhance civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law and to enhance the 
general purposes of the criminal sanction. These are vague and symbolic objec-
tives. It is difficult to say that they are not important, but if Parliament can limit 
rights simply by offering symbolic or abstract reasons, judicial review becomes 
vacuously constrained. People should not be left guessing why their Charter 
rights have been infringed. Here, the government failed to identify particular 
problems requiring a denial of the right to vote, making it hard to say that the 
denial is aimed at a pressing and substantial purpose. The government had also 
not demonstrated that the restriction to federal inmates was rationally con-
nected to its objective or minimally impaired the right to vote.  
2. Dissent68 (per Gonthier, L’Heureux-Dubé, Major and Bastarache JJ. concur-
ring) 
The minority reasoned that where limitations on Charter rights are based on 
philosophical, political and social considerations not capable of scientific proof, 
the court ought to look to the text of section 1 of the Charter, the basic princi-
ples of that section, and its relationship with the rights and freedoms in the 
Charter. Where the social or political philosophy advanced by Parliament rea-
sonably justifies a limitation of a right, it ought to be upheld as constitutional. 
Here, the temporary disenfranchising of some inmates was reasonably seen by 
Parliament as strengthening the rule of law, democracy, and the right to vote, 
and should be upheld. 
Where as part of the dialogue between Parliament and the court Parliament 
has chosen to draw a particular line regarding which offences are serious 
enough to warrant losing the vote the court ought, said the minority, to show 
some deference.  
Justice Gonthier also dismissed the alternative argument that the voting re-
striction violated section 15 equality rights primarily on the basis that being a 
prisoner was not an enumerated or analogous ground and that the fact of being 
a prisoner did not arise from stereotypical application of presumed group char-
acteristics, but by the past commission of serious criminal acts by that individ-
ual.  
                                                                                                                                                              
68
 Id., at paras. 65-208. 
288  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
3. Comment 
(a) Division on Deference 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s strong pronouncements against deference stands 
in stunning contrast to her reliance on the need for dialogue in Hall and her 
joining in the dissent in Golden. Three of the dissenting justices, L’Heureux-
Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ., return to the justification of the need for 
deference employed in Golden. Here the need for deference is weakly69 justi-
fied on the basis that the case raised philosophical, political and social consid-
erations. It is hard to think of a criminal case that doesn’t! 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the great champion of equality rights and of a 
broad test of discrimination focusing on whether a law diminishes the dig-
nity of a group, here joins Gonthier J. in rejecting the section 15 claim for 
penitentiary inmates denied the right to vote.  
4. General Observations 
(a) Voting Patterns 
Four cases do not make a trend. Nevertheless the following patterns (S de-
noting pro state and D denoting pro accused) will come as no surprise to those 
following the Court’s many rulings on criminal justice matters:  
 
 Golden Shearing  Hall  Sauvé 
McLachlin C.J.  S  D  S  D 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.  S  S  S  S 
Gonthier J.  S  S  S  S 
Iacobucci J.  D  D  D  D 
Major J.  D  D  D  S 
Bastarache J.  S  D  S  S 
Binnie J.  D  D  S  D 
Arbour J.  D  D  D  D 
LeBel J.  D  D  D  D 
 
There was considerable speculation in the media that the retirement of 
Lamer C.J. would result in the Court being less divided and less pro-accused. 
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Two years later there are no clear signs on either front. Certainly McLachlin 
C.J. has had no better success in keeping her troops in order in important crimi-
nal cases. As to being pro-accused, a full evaluation of Lamer C.J.’s lengthy 
judicial record70 revealed that he was by no means unremittingly pro-accused. 
As to present members of the Court, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. tend to favour 
the accused but, like Lamer, not always. Very little attention has been paid in 
the media to the reality that L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. have over 
many years on the Court been almost unremittingly against enhancing rights 
of accused whatever the issue. So too Bastarache J. now often, but less unremit-
tingly, takes the state side. It may be healthy that there are now several swing 
votes in the form of McLachlin C.J. (perhaps the most unpredictable), Binnie 
and LeBel JJ.71 With the recent retirement of L’Heureux-Dubé J. and the pend-
ing departure of Gonthier J., the balance might change once again. Where 
Deschamp J. will fit on this spectrum remains to be seen. The judicial record of 
the newest appointment, Fish J., tends towards the protection of rights of the 
accused. 
(b) Brittle Protection of Rights of Accused  
An entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms with powerful remedies for 
exclusion of evidence and striking down legislation is an important check 
against the ever-increasing trend to law-and-order politics. Recent blunderbuss 
and politically expedient measures against organized crime72 and suspected 
terrorists,73 for example, need to be reviewed by justices who should be above 
law-and-order politics and should take their mandate to guard minority rights 
under the Constitution, which expressly include those of accused. We have seen 
that this was very powerfully expressed by Justice Iacobucci in Hall. The prob-
lem is that this was a minority position of four justices. Hopefully Hall will not 
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be “epochal.”74 Perhaps the dissenting vision in that case will come to the fore 
with a changing composition of the Court and there will be another zigzag.  
For the reasons evident in my commentary on each of the four cases digested 
in this paper, I find it disappointing and surprising that the Court ever divided. 
Wasn’t it obvious that demanding standards were needed for strip searches, that 
the bail provision was a political end run around standards the Court had im-
posed for bail, and that penitentiary inmates had a strong claim to rely on the 
unrestricted right to vote guaranteed by section 3? Although Shearing may be 
seen by some as unconscionable backtracking on rights of complainants in 
sexual assault cases, in my judgment it should serve to remove some of the 
exaggerated rhetoric from the difficult responsibility of ensuring a fair trial for 
those charged with sexual assault. Perhaps, for example, our rape shield protec-
tion,75 now the toughest in the western world especially in that it extends 
equally to the admissibility of prior sexual history with the accused,76 could be 
adjusted when the proper case reaches the Court. This does not mean, of 
course, that sexual assault laws should not guard against demonstrated myths 
and stereotypes and protect complainants’ privacy and other interests.  
Hopefully too the Court will face up to justifying future differences of view 
in difficult cases without hiding behind the language of dialogue, deference 
and/or Charter values. In each case the analysis tends to be vague and perhaps 
disingenuous. 
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